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Secularism and French Religious Liberty:  
A Sociological and Historical View 
Jean Baubérot∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
As a sociologist and historian, I would like to offer some 
hypotheses about the social and historical context in which French 
legislation and its application interrelates so conspicuously. I want to 
emphasize the word “conspicuously.” The French speak willingly of 
the “French exception,” and it is true that the French system of 
secularism has peculiar or unique traits. Current French policy 
toward new religious movements, referred to as “sects,” has 
confirmed the view held in other countries, especially the United 
States, that the French are peculiar in this regard. This view is not 
entirely incorrect, but it must be qualified and placed in context; the 
characteristics shared by France and other societies, especially 
European and North American societies, are truly numerous. These 
common characteristics form a global framework within which each 
country reacts somewhat differently based on its own history and 
current situation. 
For several decades, sociologists have classified the global context 
just described as “secularization.” The accuracy of this classification 
is currently an issue of debate, and the debate is of general interest 
because it implicates issues such as freedom of belief. 
I will first discuss different historical perceptions of secularization 
and then give my own view of the present situation. Finally, I will 
 
∗ Professor Baubérot is honorary president of the École Pratique des Hautes Études 
(Sorbonne) where he holds the chair of History and Sociology of Laïcity. This article was 
translated from French to English by the Brigham Young University Law Review. 
 1. This article is based on a presentation given at The Ninth Annual International Law 
and Religion Symposium held at Brigham Young University on October 6–9, 2002. Professor 
Baubérot gave this presentation in conjunction with a presentation by Professor Jacques 
Robert, law professor and former member of the Conseil Constitutionnel, who addressed some 
of the legal issues described herein. See Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French 
Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV. 637. 
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identify, in this context, the characteristics that are truly unique to 
the French situation. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Different Perceptions of Secularization 
1. Original sense of the word 
The development of the term “secularization” can be broken 
down into four stages. To understand the first stage, one must 
remember the original sense of the word. Secularization originally 
dealt with the appropriation of ecclesiastical goods by the civil state; 
one example is the transfer of property carried out during the 
Protestant Reformation in the Germanic Empire.2 Another example 
is the nationalization and sale of the property of the Catholic Church 
as “national goods” during the French Revolution.3 However, in the 
language of the Catholic Church, secularization has also signified the 
passage of a cleric, who is supposed to live outside the “siècle” (or 
world),4 in the “secular state,” or life “in the world.” In this way, 
one distinguishes the “regular priests” who are monks from the 
“secular priests” who are in charge of a parish. 
2. Max Weber’s analysis 
The second stage of secularization is characterized by Max 
Weber’s analyses of human sciences, developed at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. These analyses gave rise to secularization 
theories even though the German sociologist wrote principally of the 
“disillusionment” [Entzauberung]5 of the world. This 
“disillusionment” began, according to Weber, with the Hebrew 
prophets and the Greek philosophy. Disillusionment was further 
 
 2. See Jean Baubérot, La sécularisation, in Le Grand Atlas des Religions, 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA UNIVERSALIS 16 (1988). 
 3. See Claude Langlois, Religion, culte ou opinion religieuse, la politique des 
révolutionnaires, 30 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE 471 (1989). 
 4. “Siècle,” the French word for “century,” finds its roots in the Latin word 
“saeculum,” which also means “the world.” 
 5. According to Weber, the term “disillusionment” signifies a rejection of magic means 
of achieving salvation. A further and more general meaning of the word designates the 
predominance of rational instrumentality. 
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achieved by Protestantism because it “reject[ed] magic means of 
achieving salvation like so many superstitions and sacrileges.”6 The 
disillusionment of the world was thus carried out in the name of 
religious principles. However, disillusionment contributed to the 
emergence of a new phenomenon, industrial capitalism. According 
to Weber’s fundamental principle, a “paradox of outcomes,” this 
capitalism progressively pulls away from religion; the sector of 
industrial production develops on a mechanical basis, favoring an 
instrumental rationality.7 
3. Sociological theories of the late twentieth century 
The third stage of secularization is described by sociological 
theories formulated in the third quarter of the twentieth century. 
According to Peter Berger, secularization is “the process by which 
the sectors of society and culture are freed from the authority of 
religious institutions and symbols.”8 Bryan Wilson points out that a 
society becomes secularized when there is: (1) a decrease in the 
portion of wealth devoted to the “supernatural”; (2) an increased 
independence of social behaviors from religion, linked to the idea 
that social practices change living conditions; and (3) an increasing 
justification of institutions functioning with little or no tie to 
religion.9 
4. Current view of secularization 
Has religion so completely lost its social role that it operates as 
nothing more than personal belief? Wilson does not think so. He 
writes that the role of religion in a secular society consists of 
“furnishing men with comfort, in the interstices of a social system 
 
 6. MAX WEBER, L’ÉTHIQUE PROTESTANTE ET L’ESPRIT DU CAPITALISME [THE 
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM] 122 (Plon 1964) (French edition of 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie). 
 7. Id. at 248. 
 8. Peter Berger, La religion dans la conscience moderne, in LE CENTURION 174 (1971); 
Bryan Wilson, Reflections on a Many Sided Controversy, in RELIGION AND MODERNIZATION: 
SOCIOLOGISTS AND HISTORIANS DEBATE THE SECULARIZATION THESIS 195 (Steve Bruce 
ed., 1992). 
 9. BRYAN WILSON, CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF RELIGION 25 (1976); 
Wilson, supra note 8. 
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deprived of soul, where men are half-consenting prisoners.”10 But a 
more common, or “vulgar,” vision of secularization has made 
religion a sort of relic, destined to disappear sooner or later as the 
world’s diverse societies proceed to modernity. 
It is this current and “vulgar” vision of secularization—the 
fourth stage—that Berger criticizes, considering it unfaithful to the 
mental processes that underlay the theories of secularization. For 
Berger, the turning point of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
was “furiously religious.”11 Admittedly, certain forms of 
secularization have affected society; however, they have not 
necessarily reached the consciences of many within society, and “the 
attempts of different religious denominations to adapt to the 
supposed demands of a secularized world . . . have, in general, 
failed.”12 On the contrary, a revival has appeared of “conservative” 
movements that “show[s] that counter-secularization is at least as 
significant, in the contemporary world, as secularization.” Berger 
concludes: “This interaction of the forces of secularization and 
counter-secularization is one of the most important subjects for the 
sociology of contemporary religion.”13 
B. Not Desecularization, but Established Secularization 
With this foundation established, I would like to add my own 
perspective and examine how it is possible to analyze the French 
situation. First, it seems to me that even if Berger’s criticisms are 
justified, they do not invalidate the theories of secularization. In 
effect, these criticisms have not claimed that the decreasing social 
influence of religion leads to its disappearance. These criticisms 
indicate instead that the decreasing social influence of religion has 
led to a transformation of religious phenomena. 
Berger himself insisted on the pluralization of religious forms 
corresponding to secularization. He analogized the religious scene of 
secular society to a market in which several religious entrepreneurs 
must compete. Berger further compared the religious scene of 
 
 10. Bryan Wilson, Aspects of Secularization in the West, 3 JAPANESE J. RELIGIOUS STUD. 
276 (1976) (cited by JEAN-PAUL WILLAIME, SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS 94 (PUF 1995)). 
 11. PETER BERGER, LE RÉENCHANTEMENT DU MONDE [THE DESECULARIZATION OF 
THE WORLD] 15 (2001). 
 12. Id. at 17. 
 13. Id. at 21. Unfortunately, however, to my knowledge, Berger has not undertaken the 
study of this interaction. 
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secular society to a market of meanings, a market of definitions, and 
a market of sensibilities where the line between religious ideas and 
non-religious ideas (for example, psychology) tends to blur. From 
this point on, the Christian denominations, for example, have 
incentive to close ranks, banding together in the face of increasing 
competition from new sources. Ecumenism thus appears as a strategy 
of response to secularization.14 Likewise, since the 1970s, for Wilson 
and others, new religious movements are better positioned than the 
“main churches” to fill a social role in secular society. The success of 
new religious movements rests on their ability to build bridges—
reaching out to the modern world and populations destabilized by 
socioeconomic changes. This ability derives particularly from the fact 
that these movements provide “truths to believe” that are simple and 
clear, tied to precise norms, capable of structuring the individual and 
giving him a strong identity. 
With this perspective, one could say that the new religious fervor 
implicates less the analyses of secularization than it does the manner 
in which these analyses were ideologized and transformed into 
strategies of ecclesiastical adaptation. If these strategies failed, it is 
not because modern societies are not secularized in their social 
function; rather, it is because modern societies are so secularized that 
it is suicidal for churches to seek adaptation at all costs. It is precisely 
because societies are secularized that individuals who have varying 
“religious needs” expect something other than a mere imitation of 
society. The success of “counter-secularization” movements can 
probably be explained by the worldwide advances of secularization 
and the resistance produced by these advances. Thus, sociologist 
Sebastian Poulder links the intensity of conflicts concerning the 
status of women and family law in predominantly Islamic countries 
to the fact that in those countries today the major part of an 
individual’s public life is managed according to secularized Western 
norms.15 Some issues that straddle the border between public and 
private realms then play into a high-stakes question: whether to 
preserve an admittedly tense situation in line with traditional culture 
 
 14. Ecumenism is the process that drove the Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox 
churches to begin a process of dialogue and improved relations with the eventual goal of 
reunifying the Christian churches. See JEAN-PAUL WILLAIME, VERS DE NOUVEAUX 
ŒCUMÉNISMES 12 (1989). 
 15. SEBASTIAN POULDER, ETHNICITY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ENGLISH 
EXPERIENCE (1998). 
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or to neglect that culture completely in favor of secularized norms. 
At stake here is of course more than merely the concerns of Islam. 
This high-stakes question is all the more pressing if, in the face of 
traditional cultures, the rights of man are emphasized. Further, the 
philosophy of Max Weber indicates that a dual extension plays an 
integral part in the problem: the extension of capitalism’s mechanical 
base and the extension of capitalism’s instrumental rationality.16 It is 
evident that commercialization is reaching domains that appeared 
out of reach fifty years ago. So it is, for example, with the domain of 
the “intimate” and of sexuality with the development of mass 
pornography. Commercialization has also reached into all elements 
of birth, life, and even death with the speedy growth of 
biotechnology. As the commercial sphere extends in this way, 
problems of meaning return en force as problems of society. These 
problems take on new importance—beyond just the “interstices of a 
social system.”17 Rather, it is in a structural sense that questions of 
finality and observed rationality take on new importance. 
On the other hand, if one considers the second indicator offered 
by Wilson to gauge a society’s degree of secularization—an increased 
independence of social behaviors from religion, linked to the idea 
that the social practices are what change living conditions18—one can 
draw two conclusions. 
The first conclusion is that it was the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment who extolled this increased independence of social 
behaviors. These philosophers encouraged independent social 
behavior by emphasizing two “hopes.” The first hope of the 
Enlightenment philosophy is that changes in the condition of life will 
move in the direction of progress.19 The second hope is that increased 
connectedness is good: technical progress allowing increased 
satisfaction of the needs of humanity and the advancement of well-
being; moral progress that lessens the violence in human relationships 
and leads to a harmonious coexistence; political progress permitting 
the gradual, historical realization of freedom, equality, and justice. The 
utopian ethic has played a key role in the secularization movement. 
 
 16. WEBER, supra note 6, at 250. 
 17. See BERGER, supra note 11. 
 18. See Wilson, supra note 10. 
 19. The belief in progress has been the driving force behind secularization. 
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Economic liberalism,20 political liberalism,21 and the philosophies of 
progress22 are in fact parallel social and cultural phenomena. Together, 
these three liberalisms make up what is generally called modernity. 
Thus, the ideal of progress is common to both liberalism23 and 
socialism. And if socialism ideologically opposes capitalism, it is 
essentially because of the gulf between the ideal and reality. Thus, 
according to socialism, one must “go beyond” capitalism to overcome 
this gulf. Moreover, we must not forget that Nazism also called itself 
“national socialism.” Nazism styled itself as socialist, but with the 
conspicuous difference that it refused an inclusive outlook in favor of a 
xenophobic attitude. Raymond Aron referred to communism and 
Nazism, significantly, as “secular religions.”24 One can say that in the 
dialectical process of disillusionment, secularization has borne the 
structural elements of “reillusionment.”25 
To this first conclusion, another can be added: these secular 
notions so recently “reillusioned” find themselves currently again in 
the process of disillusionment. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
effectively marked the end of a historic period—an age of 
enlightenment and of revolutions bearing ideas of global progress, 
revolutions that have caused comings and goings on a global scale, 
from the Americas to China, passing back and forth through Europe 
along the way. Francis Fukuyama saw in this event “the end of 
history,” the liberal democracy forming the ultimate manifestation of 
government—a form that will not be superseded.26 But Fukuyama 
was without a doubt too optimistic in underestimating the inherent 
paradoxes of the system. Fukuyama failed to account not only for a 
continued coexistence between wealth and poverty, but also for an 
 
 20. The French “libéralisme économique” corresponds most with the American idea of 
economic conservatism, emphasizing free market principles.  Economic liberalism is linked to 
the development of capitalism. 
 21. Political liberalism led to the emergence of modern liberal democracies. 
 22. The philosophies of progress are linked to the nineteenth-century boom in various 
scientific disciplines. 
 23. The French word for liberalism, especially used in its economic sense, is closely 
linked to the American idea of capitalism.  See supra note 20. 
 24. RAYMOND ARON, L’OPIUM DES INTELLECTUELS (1955). 
 25. By this, I mean that in constructive opposition to the process dominated by 
instrumental rationality, one finds a process where beliefs develop that are “secular” (that 
concern the “siècle,” or the everyday world, see supra note 4). These beliefs are not formed or 
advanced explicitly as beliefs but can be recognized as such by sociologists. 
 26. See FRANCIS FULCUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (Free Press 
1992). 
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end to secular horizons that, no matter what the difficulties, allow 
for projections about the future. Moreover, even if technological 
progress continues and supplies perennial hope, this secular hope is 
increasingly overcome by a growing uncertainty. The mission of 
medicine has consisted of increasing “the hope of life.” Whatever the 
personal convictions of the doctor, medical institutions have 
provided a secular brand of hope. This hope is not dead, but in one 
respect it is dying because the new AIDS epidemic has brutally 
removed the illusion of an almost all-powerful mastery. On the other 
hand, the very success of medicine itself poses more and more 
unpublished problems. Undoubtedly, the practice of medicine 
changes the conditions of life, but if several decades ago this practice 
was universally considered morally good, this consensus no longer 
exists today. A single example illustrates this point. When faced with 
a dying patient, the possibility for the doctor to opt for either a 
regime of intensive medication or euthanasia is becoming more and 
more difficult. Now, intensive medication and euthanasia are morally 
debatable. In a more general vein, the whole range of issues 
pertaining to biotechnology can give rise to moral debates. Is all 
possible progress also desirable? That is now the big question, and 
not only in the medical field. Consider all that contributes to 
environmental degradation. The results of progress give way to 
increasing uncertainty and to conflict-charged questions about the 
appropriate limits of progress. 
I propose to call this situation “established secularization.” The 
combination of the dual historical transformation I have briefly 
described—that of disillusionment, reillusionment, and globalization, 
the founding of “a world market encircled by a vast shantytown”27—
does not signify the end of secularization. Instead, this combination 
signals a transformation of secularization. Changing from a process 
to a movement, secularization is becoming a hegemonic reality that 
has destroyed secular illusions, whether they are ideological/political 
or technical/moral illusions. 
This new disillusionment is different in its relation to the passing 
of time. Ephemeral effects thus are becoming more important than 
investments in long-term projects. That which derived more or less 
from ritual and permanence is becoming the result of passing whim. 
 
 27. Emile Poulat, Après la fin de l’Histoire, quelle histoire pour l’humanité?, FOI ET 
DÉVELOPPEMENT, janvier– février 1995, at 1 nn.229–30. 
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Mass communication favors sensationalism over analysis in the news, 
emphasizing its entertainment value. This entertainment broadcasts 
sex, violence, intrigue, heroism, and wealth in large doses. It can lead 
to resentment because of the sizable gap between the imaginary 
notions conveyed and the true nature of daily life with all its banality, 
difficulty, and routine. 
It is in this context of secularization28 that the resurgence of 
traditionalist undercurrents has come about in the historic religions: 
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism. It is also in this context 
that new religious movements have developed. These undercurrents 
and movements, in all democratic societies, inure a priori to the 
benefit of freedom of belief. But this statement of principle does not 
provide a complete concrete solution because the division between 
the religious and the nonreligious has never been well defined, and 
secularization blurs that division even further. 
C. The Specifics of French Secularism 
Let us turn now to an examination of the peculiar role played by 
the French situation in the larger context of secularization. The first 
aspect to consider is the way that modern France is organized. The 
founding event was the French Revolution. At that time, in spite of a 
clergy favorable to the revolution,29 several factors quickly drew into 
conflict the Catholic religion—the only one that was legitimate 
under the old regime—and revolutionary ideals. 
In other countries, like the United States and the United 
Kingdom, religion contributed in various ways to secularization and 
particularly to the development of a democratic sociability. In certain 
cases, the paradoxical term “religious secularization” may best 
describe nineteenth-century development.30 In France, however, the 
process of secularization unfolded as a frontal conflict between what 
is called “clericalism,” or the claim of religion to political dominion 
over the country, and the anticlericalism that actively fought this 
claim. 
 
 28. Naturally, I do not claim that this context has been fully explicated. 
 29. Of the pro-revolution clergy here described, Abbot Grégoire is currently the most 
well known. 
 30. See JEAN BAUBÉROT & SÉVERINE MATHIEU, RELIGION, MODERNITÉ ET CULTURE 
AU ROYAUME-UNI ET EN FRANCE 1800–1914, at 295 (2002). 
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Anticlericalism had several faces. One face was a religious 
anticlericalism,31 predominant until the middle of the nineteenth 
century and only opposed to those it deemed to be excessive or to 
have abused politicization of religion. The Jesuits, in particular, were 
suspected of seeking undue influence over the youth. In the second 
half of the century, domination by Catholic political alliances 
motivated a radical shift toward anticlericalism. The religious 
institution itself was called into question, and reference to religion 
became a call for “free religiosity,” for a personal devotion where the 
relationship with the Divine supersedes ecclesiastical structures. 
Victor Hugo is one of the most well-known representatives of this 
kind of free religiosity.  At the same time, another type of 
anticlericalism developed that included antireligious aspects. Rooted 
in scientific ideology, this anticlericalism perceived religion as an 
outdated explanation of the world that offered only a backwards 
orientation, irrelevant to the context of modern democracies. To this 
view, socioeconomic arguments were sometimes added denouncing 
religion as an “accomplice” in the “exploitation of the working 
class.” 
The ties between various forms of anticlericalism, from the most 
radical to the more moderate, and the French Revolution are moral 
as well as political. The rights of man, as proclaimed by the 
revolution, appeared as nonreligious values, even antagonistic toward 
Catholicism, and Catholicism was the lens through which all religion 
was viewed at the time. Mona Ozouf demonstrated that, beyond 
mere political changes, the goal of the French Revolution was to 
regenerate the human being, to create a “new man.”32 Therefore, it 
is not surprising that this reference to the founding age of the 
revolution has also taken on a quasi-religious dimension. In my 
mind, the most ideological forms of French republicanism can 
indeed be termed a “secular religion.”33 
This secular religion had its institutions in both academia and 
medicine. This may not seem too unique, but despite the creation 
and development of medical and academic institutions all over the 
Western world during the nineteenth century, the French approach 
 
 31. See id. at 150. 
 32. MONA OZOUF, L’HOMME RÉGÉNÉRÉ (1989). 
 33. This term is used in an analagous sense to the term “secular religions” employed by 
Raymond Aron with reference to communism and nazism.  See supra note 25. 
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was unique. Claude Nicolet writes, “[R]ecourse to medicine will not 
become a totally moral obligation tied to the nature of a specific 
political regime.”34 Under this view, to take care of oneself was not 
only a personal affair, but also the duty of a citizen and an evidence 
of civic morals. In the French republican perspective, the school does 
not merely impart knowledge, it is the place of apprenticeship and 
liberty of thought. 
It is important to distinguish “freedom of conscience” from 
“freedom of thought.” Freedom of conscience, along with its 
constituents, freedom of religion and freedom of belief, guarantees 
diversity of belief in society and the freedom to express those beliefs. 
Freedom of thought ensures the right to independently reexamine 
beliefs received from family, social groups, and society as a whole. 
This way, a person can freely adhere to these beliefs, adapt them, or 
turn from them to something else. Naturally, this is a conceptual 
distinction, and daily life produces constant disharmony between 
these two freedoms. But the perspective is not the same, and the 
French view school as the perfect institution to teach future citizens 
to exploit their faculties of reason and to help them exercise freedom 
of thought. The problem is that people can cease to view reason 
itself as a simple instrument, enshrining it instead. Indeed, there was 
a short-lived but authentic cult during the revolution (1793–1794) 
that actually worshipped the “Goddess of Reason.”35 
The founding of secularism in France was rooted in the political 
victory of the anticlerical movement. In effect, anticlericalism and the 
establishment of the Third Republic were tied together for several 
reasons. But even so, at the end of the day, secular law left freedom 
of conscience intact—not to mention freedom of worship, freedom 
of religion, and freedom of belief. I will not go into the details of the 
specific legislation for two reasons. On the one hand, such an 
explication would lead to a historic account that is beyond the scope 
of this paper. On the other hand, the great and historic legislative 
acts concerning school (the 1880s) and the separation of church and 
state (1905–1908) are still a part of French code, despite seeing 
some natural developments over the past century.36 I will simply say, 
 
 34. CLAUDE NICOLET, L’IDÉE RÉPUBLICAINE EN FRANCE 310 (1982) (“[L]e recours à 
la médecine ne deviendra aussi nettement une obligation morale liée à la nature d’un régime 
politique précis”). 
 35. See MICHEL VOVELLE, LA RÉVOLUTION CONTRE L’EGLISE (1988). 
 36. See Robert, supra note 1. 
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in synthesis, that over time the primarily combative anticlerical 
movement gave birth to a primarily pacifist secularism. It is as if a 
revolutionary socialist party, assuming power by democratic process 
and keeping the democratic framework, ultimately gave birth to a 
social-democratic system. 
It is easy to understand why this pacifist result displeased many 
republicans. Over the course of the Third Republic, there was a 
progressive disillusionment with republicanism as the republican 
regime came to be viewed as routine. This disillusionment was due in 
part to the establishment of secularism and to the loss by the 
anticlericalism movement of its utopian designs (which are common 
to all combative movements). Nevertheless—and this is essential—the 
combative and utopian aspects of anticlericalism did not disappear. 
Since anticlericalism was finding it so difficult to align itself with 
republicanism, it aligned itself with socialism. In France, there was a 
joining of secular illusions; in large measure, the various forms of 
socialism and communism identified with republicanism in an effort to 
resurrect and propagate republicanism’s utopian aspects. But this 
happened at the very moment when republicans had just become 
firmly entrenched in power. Thus, pragmatism and management 
problems won out over the utopian flame. Illusionment and the 
utopian ideal, inspiring great passion, gave rise to the youth revolt of 
May 1968. 
The situation changed during the last two decades of the 
twentieth century. First, it changed because of the fall of 
communism and Marxism, which led to the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989. Second, it changed because the socialist party assumed 
power in France in 1981. The party’s slogan, “change life,” faded in 
the difficulties of governance and clashed with the effect described 
above: faith’s surrender to progress caused by growing uncertainty 
and questions about the appropriate limits of progress. A significant 
example occurred in 1983 when the French National Ethics Advisory 
Council was created and charged with considering the ethical impact 
of developments in biotechnology.37 As a result, the republican 
nation-state suffered a profound crisis. Three principal factors explain 
this crisis. First, there was a loss of ascendancy over the republican 
nation-state due both to the globalization process and to the 
 
 37. See Jean Baubérot, Le débat sur la laïcité, REGARDS SUR L’ACTUALITÉ, Mar.–Apr. 
1995, at 56 nn.209–10 (Les grands débats des années Mitterrand). 
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developing European structure and its accompanying transfers of 
power. The second factor is likewise linked to globalization. The 
development of mass, globalized consumption changed the 
relationship between the French and their institutions; a consumer-
oriented attitude towards medicine and school has replaced the 
deferential attitude formerly held by the French. Finally, the nature 
of immigration—people moving from a different culture—has 
changed. Immigration is no longer limited to seasonal migrant 
workers, single men traveling between France and their native 
country to take advantage of the strong economy and an abundance 
of work. Rather, immigrants now come with their families to settle in 
a precarious setting of homelessness, unemployment, and social 
exclusion. This crisis of the republican nation-state and its 
institutions results in a reillusionment of republicanism for some, and 
for a greater number, a discomfort bordering on tension and fear. 
Two reactions are possible to what has been improperly termed 
the “return of the religious” and to what Berger called the 
movements of counter-secularization. The first reaction comes from 
republican reillusionment. Thus it is that young Muslim students 
(the children of recent immigrants) have refused to remove their 
head scarves in the classroom. This began in 1989, and for several 
years it has been a national issue despite the fact that a judicial 
solution to the problem, both secular and democratic, was quickly 
found. This solution has been difficult to apply because, in short, the 
head scarf affair pitted supporters of republican reillusionment and 
defense of the academic institution against militant supporters of 
(and those influenced by) a counter-secularized Islam. 
The second reaction comes from a general unrest caused by the 
current state of affairs in France. This unrest could harm Islam, as 
attested to by the bad will borne by certain administrative authorities 
and local politicians toward Islam, combined with the need for 
construction of new mosques. Indeed, this unrest can harm any 
religious movement that has not yet fully adapted to secularization. 
Significantly, the two most problematic areas are the academic and 
medical fields. Many today have an effectively ambivalent attitude 
with regard to institutions, much as they do with regard to moral 
rules. They insist on a consumer relationship for themselves but 
demand that these institutions exercise authority over others. In any 
case, a certain reentrenchment is apparent. There is a 
reentrenchment at school, where certain accommodations, such as a 
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religion-based waiver from the requirement to attend class on 
Saturday, are becoming much more difficult to obtain. There is also 
a re-entrenchment in the field of medicine where the notion of 
illegal practice of medicine has become a bludgeon used to condemn 
certain individuals and groups. And this occurs despite the fact that 
traditionally there was a certain tolerance in France toward attempts 
at religious healing. 
This having been written, it would be wrong to oversimplify 
current problems in terms of these reentrenchments and 
reillusionments. Certain religious groups that are rebellious and even 
hostile to human rights enjoy nondiscriminatory treatment at the 
hands of public authorities, who choose not to discriminate because 
of those very same rights. There are also certain apocalyptic groups 
that await the end of the world in a way that poses a risk of collective 
suicide. In such cases, if the law imposes limits on their actions, a 
concrete solution will be difficult to find. It is thus all the more 
important that society first understand itself before attempting to 
find solutions, and it is my goal to help society in its struggle to 
understand itself. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a dual conclusion. First, the problems 
encountered by France regarding freedom of belief are not 
fundamentally different from those encountered by other western 
societies even though certain aspects do constitute French 
peculiarities. Second, though it is common to spotlight the 
difficulties, we must not forget that freedom of belief is guaranteed 
in France. Every weekend, millions of people living in France go in 
freedom and in peace to religious services. This success is due to the 
achievements of French secular legislation. Nevertheless, vigilance is 
essential because, although French legislation gives serious 
guarantees on the matter, the dominant mindset can either negate 
those guarantees or disrupt the calmness that must preside over 
application of the law. 
 
